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Abstract
With the labor market fed by international migrations, global capitalism has seen a
resurgence of archaic forms of labor in certain industries since the s. The old capitalist
strategy of employing multiethnic workforces has resurfaced in seafaring and trans-
national construction, which rely mainly on migrant male workers. In Western economies,
the hiring of servants was thought to be a thing of the past, but today female migrants are
widely employed as paid domestic workers. In industrializing Asia, the hiring of foreign
domestic workers has also surged. Despite appearances, these old labor forms indicate a
new set of contradictions directly implicated in the structuring of transnational social class
and status relations. States play instrumental roles as labor recruiters and as users of
migrant labor with few citizenship rights. The tighter interconnectedness of the global
economy and of class practices notwithstanding, labor migrations deepen national attach-
ment and reinforce the view of class structures as fundamentally national formations.
This phenomenon is examined from the perspective of the Philippines.
Keywords: international migration, nationalism, transnationalism, class formation, the
state, domestic work, seafaring, construction industry
Globalization is not new, although as the grand narrative of our time it is. More than at
any other historical period, the interconnectedness of otherwise distant and disparate
parts of the world is increasingly being recognized. Social relations, networks and
institutions are at present consciously structured and nurtured with the spherical earth
as the frame of reference. The multiple forces of globalization define the material and
ideational parameters within which economic, political, cultural and ecological practices,
identities, and relations are contested, redefined, reconstituted, and transformed [Held
et al. ]. However, after  September  the vision of a singular world society with
a shared global culture has been buried in the realization that the world remains deeply
fractured by ideological chasms that are created and reinforced by the very same
contradictory processes that propel globalization [Mann ].
The world is divided not only by ideational factors. The “global village” is uneven in
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both geographic and social terms. The global interstate system is profoundly asymmet-
rical, and the territorial domains of nation-states suggest a highly unequal economic
geography. The world is also hierarchically stratified by inequalities of social class and
status positions. In social theory class structures have been conceptualized convention-
ally in “national” terms: despite the historical and structural linkages of economies and
states, every nation-state has been theorized in terms of a specific and autonomous social
class formation. The narratives and practices of contemporary globalization, however,
call attention to the structuring of class relations across state boundaries. As “national”
class structures are intermeshed, transnational class relations make patent that global
contradictions penetrate the local, even as the local forms an integral part of the global.
The extreme unevenness that characterizes the world is made visible in local class
hierarchies that are incomprehensible apart from the global.
That local and global class relations are mutually determinative is crystallized by
processes of international transborder migrations. But although the causal forces attend-
ing migration flows around the world have been widely analyzed from political, eco-
nomic and cultural perspectives, the complex relationships that entangle social classes
with population movements have not received a commensurate analytical focus. The
preponderance of “push-pull” theories of migration has led to the relative neglect of
William McNeill’s [] early stress on the need to analyze human migratory processes
in terms of “elites” and “masses.” To bring to the fore the dimension of social classes in
on-going global migrations, this article focuses on forms of the labor process that can be
regarded as “traditional” but, on closer inspection, indicate social relations and class
contradictions distinctive of the late twentieth century. By focusing on these seemingly
archaic labor formswhich surged with the rise of neoliberalism and deregulation in the
sthis article proposes that international migrations are implicated in processes of
class formation and change that cut across state boundaries. These processes are
inherently contradictory: they reinforce national sentiments and perpetuate the myth of
social class structures as exclusively “national,” thus weakening transnational solidari-
ties. At the same time, the transborder oppositional relationship between state and
migrant labor is becoming patent. Issues surrounding this immense and complex field
are explored from the vantage point of Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines.
Differential Views of Transborder Migration
Both a cause and a consequence of globalization, international migration has elicited a
wide range of views that are often contingent on one’s social-structural position in any
given country, and that country’s position in the world system. Reversing the lull of the
interwar years, international and intraregional migrations have seen tremendous acceler-
ation in the postwar period, especially since the s [Held et al. : ; Zolberg
 	 
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]. The departure of members from origin-states and the arrival of “aliens” and
“strangers” in destination-states have prompted struggles over national identity, which
sometimes absorb different classes and social groups within the polity in fierce debates.
But contestations over culture are never far from economic and political considerations.
These seemingly separate domains are inextricably intertwined. Thus, migration is
embedded in wider social, cultural, political, ecological and economic processes that
suffuse the world system [Zolberg ; Sassen ]. In Europe, for instance, questions
regarding the nature of the welfare state and of citizenship have been inseparable from
issues of nationhood, race, and Europeanness. As Etienne Balibar [: ] avers, the
resurgence of racism in Europe owes to the current ambiguities in the state-form, which
is national but straddles a supranational matrix. Europe’s transitional state-form projects
the image of, at once, “an over-powerful and powerless machine” that opens borders to
illicit labor but is unable to control those borders.
In the United States immigrant scholars celebrate the transnation and the freedom
from what are seen as the confining politics, parochial concerns and rigid constraints of
the nation-state, with Arjun Appadurai [] as an exemplary case. Others hail trans-
nationalism as affording immigrants, constrained by racism in the destination-state, to be
continually involved in the nation-building of their adopted countries as well as their
homelands despite the physical distance [Basch et al. ]. But transnationality may be
viewed differently from the other side. In the Philippines, public intellectuals have
portrayed permanent immigrants in North America as buying the “American dream” and
turning their backs on the nation, remittances and other transnational links notwith-
standing [Vergara ]. Depending on the position of the intellectual, on one side of the
globe, immigrants are lauded as embodying autonomy and liberation; on the other side,
they are disparaged as deserters, even traitors.
Moreover, in the Philippines, middle class emigrants who move to advanced capital-
ist countries typified by the United States are often juxtaposed to labor migrants from
middle and lower classes who work contractually in a range of destinations around the
world. While the former are stereotypically seen as settling into a life of ease, comfort
and abundance, labor migrants evoke pity for enduring hardship and separation from kin
to eke out a living. Whereas permanent immigrants are portrayed as privileged, labor
migrants are cast in the role of the unfortunate and the sacrificial. But the distinctions
between these two groups are oftentimes vague. Even the divide in the duration of stay
overseas may be far from sharp. Technically, labor migrants on fixed-term contracts are
unlike permanent immigrants because they are obliged by the terms of their employment
to return to the homeland after a specified period of work. Nevertheless, labor migrants
are often able to stay in their country of employment for an extended period in a manner
that transforms them into semi-permanent emigrants. In some parts of Europe labor
migrants have become permanent residents and may even have undergone naturaliza-
tion.
A<J>A6G: Global Migrations, Old Labor Forms, and New Transborder Class Relations
139
Within the homeland, views differ on the meanings and ramifications of permanent
immigration and contract labor migration, both of which gained momentum in the
s. State actors have raised labor migrants on a pedestal as heroes of the nation, who
shore up the Philippine economy through remittances that  Central Bank figures
indicate amounted to over US$ billion [Cabungcal ]. In October  the economic
bounty translated into the passage by both chambers of the Philippine Congress of
separate versions of an absentee voting bill. Signed by the president into law on 
February , the final legislation allows the overseas Filipino electorate to cast votes
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives in the 	 elections,
subject to mandatory review in  [BusinessWorld ; INQ7.net a]. Also in
October , the Philippine Senate passed a bill on the dual citizenship rights of
natural-born Filipinos, an unprecedented move that underscores the state’s instrumental-
ist approach to citizenship [Aguilar ].
The positive, if expedient and opportunistic, stance of state actors toward migrant
workers is in marked contrast to the view of many members of the middle and upper
classes who regard the migrants’ low-status jobs as a source of national shame and
dishonor. These comfortable classes feel demeaned that the Philippines has gained a
worldwide reputation as a provider of low-status workers, a status that by association
debases them as well because of shared nationality [Aguilar ; Tadiar ]. In 
,
for instance, many protested against the inclusion of the word Filipineza (Filipina) in a
Greek dictionary with its given meaning as “a domestic worker from the Philippines or a
person [from any country] who performs non-essential auxiliary tasks” [Philippine Daily
Inquirer 
; Rufo and Digma 
]. “Filipina” and “domestic work” have become
reducible and interchangeable, to the chagrin of Filipino elites. For their part, activists
take up the cudgels for labor migrants whom they see as victims of global and domestic
structures of inequality and oppression, and as veritable slaves in the modern world. At
the individual level, migrants endure the hardships of dislocation in pursuit of better
incomes, personal autonomy, and a broader view of the world, while giving vent to
brewing consumerist desires [Aguilar b].
Perceptions of and reactions to transborder migrations are necessarily divergent
because of differing social-structural positions within and across nation-states. Philip-
pine middle classes feel concerned or embarrassed precisely because labor migrants
appear on the world stage as a subordinate group engaged in “traditional” occupations of
trifling value and status even by homeland standards. In the Philippines, the domestic
worker is often no better than a downtrodden “maid” (utusan, atsay) or at best a lowly
“helper” (katulong), most likely a poorly paid migrant from a remote rural area. Migrants’
occupations are devalued because of their seeming backwardness and association with
“undignified” and “non-essential” work, as if they have no role in contemporary moder-
nity. A closer examination suggests otherwise.
 	 
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The Reinvention of the Multiethnic Workforce
The increased circulation of migratory and ambulatory labor has been associated with
the persistence and reinvention of seemingly obsolete and destined-to-disappear forms
and relations in world capitalism. The redeployment of ancient practices has occurred
particularly in activities that have undergone comparatively limited mechanization (as in
paid domestic work) and in activities where some forms of labor power have been
irreplaceable (as in seafaring). Old labor strategies have also been used in industries
where capital is subject to spatial fixity (as in construction) and therefore physically
unable to relocate to sources of cheap labor, an option otherwise available to manufactur-
ing industries in the export processing zones of peripheral states [Gibson and Graham
].
These reinvented forms of labor relations, particularly in seafaring and construction,
rely upon workers, principally male, drawn from different countries and pooled together
in a common workplace. The workers’ diversified origins offer possibilities for global
solidarity; at the same time, however, the intersection of capitalist interests and national
sentiments negate the prospects of such unity. In the global workplace cross-national
alliances and friendships arise, but in the same breath national attachments are deepened.
The global workplace graphically encodes the ideological tensions of capitalism that, as
argued by Immanuel Wallerstein [], symbiotically link universalism to racism and
sexism.
The practice of mobilizing persons from all sorts of “ethnic” backgrounds to serve as
crew of ocean-going vessels is centuries old, antedating the nation-state. In business from
the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Dutch VOC hired all sorts of poor
European men to work as sailors and soldiers. Although not its original intention, the
Netherlands East India Company “had to take what men they could get” to work as
sailors, with the advantage that “the mixture of nationalities on board a ship lessened the
chances of a successful mutiny being hatched among the men” [Boxer : ]. The
mercenaries hired by the Company were an even more heterogeneous lot. Outnumbering
Dutch soldiers were Germans, Swiss, Poles, English, Scots, Irish, Danes, Flemings, French,
Japanese and other foreigners who manned the garrisons and defended Dutch ships [ibid.:
]. These men formed the lower ranks of a global corporation, the wealthiest in its
time, whose rendezvous point was Batavia on the island of Java, where a peculiarly
Eurasian society emerged [Taylor 	]. After the VOC’s bankruptcy, the colonial army
of the Dutch East Indies, which was organized in the 	s and abolished in ,
recruited a mix of soldiers who gave it the reputation as “the sink-hole of Europe” [Ming
	: ].
Joining the ranks of the world’s paid seafaring workforce were men from the Spanish
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Philippines, then known as Manilamen, who found employment aboard European and
American merchant vessels in the nineteenth century. The seafaring crews of inter-
national merchant ships were multiethnic. Actively joining such crews were Manilamen
who were found in a multitude of ports around the world, from Hong Kong, Singapore
and Cape Town to London, New York and Philadelphia [López Jaena : ]. They
enjoyed a “worldwide” reputation as “highly capable crewmen about merchant vessels”
[MacMicking : ]. Writing in 	, MacMicking [ibid.: ] noted that the literacy
of “the Manilla men serving on board of ships and composing their crews” was very
impressive and “frequently remarked upon [even] by people very strongly prejudiced in
favor of white men, and who despise the black skins of Manilla men.” While the Spanish
colony they came from was only fitfully engaging with the world-system, these Manila-
men were immersed in the vortex of global capitalism and represented the vanguard of
an emerging national proletariat. As emblematized by seafarers in the late nineteenth
century, the Philippine workforce was, in the first instance, global before it became
national.
At present, the Philippines is the biggest provider of seafarers, accounting for about
 percent of the world’s 
 million seafarers [Tyner 		: ]. Filipinos are thus
ubiquitous in ports around the world. They are part of an international proletariat in the
service of both transnational shipping capital and the nation-state that benefits from
seafarers’ salaries a large chunk of which is subject to mandatory remittance. In , the
Philippine government ruled that 	 percent to 	 percent of all overseas workers’ salaries
be remitted to the homeland, but only seafarers are likely to comply because, unlike other
contract workers, their salaries are paid by manning agencies right in the Philippines
[Rodriguez : ]. As labor exporter the Philippine state is a stakeholder in the global
shipping industry [Tyner 		].
Filipinos work alongside Bangladeshi, British, Croatian, Indian, Maltese, Polish,
Swedish, and other workers on the sea lanes of the world, where the dynamics of a
working class that is cosmopolitan and national-particularist are simultaneously played
out. Viewed from one angle, shipping crews traverse international waters and constitute
a workforce that literally transcends all political borders. On the same floating space are
mingled different ethnic, national and racial affinities. Concomitantly, however, the
system of nation-states and the workers’ own national sentiment fasten them to identifi-
able polities and homelands.
This heterogeneous workforce owes to the shipping industry’s deregulation since the
	s. Owners have been able to register their vessels using so-called flags of convenience
“to avoid the regulatory frameworks imposed by traditional maritime nations,” freeing
them to “go global” in search of cheap labor [Sampson 			]. The industry has sur-
mounted the protectionist and racialized policies of “white” seamen’s unions that sur-
faced in the early twentieth century, such as those in Scotland from 	 onwards
[McFarland ]. Taking advantage of the socio-geographic disparities of world devel-
  
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opment, shipping capital enforces differential wage rates that embody capital’s marriage
with racism, in a wage scale determined by seemingly innate attributes of the workers’
cultural-national geo-economies of origin. Consequently, nationals of “First World”
states receive higher returns to labor than their counterparts from “Third World” states.
Survey data for  suggest that the monthly earnings of a German “able seaman” were
 times greater than that of a Bangladeshi; by , Japanese able seamen earned 
times more than Bangladeshis. The use of cheap labor has increasingly cut the global
average wage, the  figure of US$ being only three-quarters of the  average
[Kahveci ]. Despite data collection problems, the wage structure indicates that
Americans and Britons earn substantially more than Filipinos, who are followed closely
by Russians and Indians; beneath them are Bulgarians and, at the lowest, Bangladeshis
[ibid.]. The reinvigorated universalism of sea transport capital, which allows for working
class convergence across politico-cultural boundaries, works as a strategy to reduce the
wage bill. On top of that, it obviates organized resistance, as in VOC days. With its
multinational labor force, shipping capital thrives on disunity and harmony, cooperation
and competition, fragmentation and stratification, as well as ethnic specialization.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the strategy of employing a
multiethnic workforce was utilized in the pearl-shell industry in tropical Australia where
Manilamen mingled, cooperated and competed with Japanese, Javanese, Malay, Melane-
sian and other divers and crew [Aguilar ]. The “non-white” divers served as a
comparatively cheap labor pool, with Manilamen serving as a foil against what capital-
ists feared were the dangers of collusion possible in an all-Japanese crew [ibid.: 	]. The
multilingual workforce constituted an “ethnological mosaic” that led an official to
remark that “Amid all this racial diversity there is a well-maintained average of orderli-
ness” [ibid.: 
]. But technological change overtook the pearl-shell industry and an overt
racism took hold of Australia at the onset of federation in , conjointly resulting in the
industry’s decline, the end of “non-white” immigration, and the temporary eclipse of
pragmatic racism. But by no means did multiethnic work forces disappear in the
world-system, and by no means did Filipinos cease to participate in them.
The advent of U. S. colonialism in the Philippines in  resulted in a new stream of
migration of Filipino workers systematically recruited to work in Hawaii’s sugarcane
plantations and in the U. S. Navy [Espiritu ]. Nationality, in conjunction with a racist
template, was the pivot of identity struggles by labor migrants precisely because planta-
tion capital deliberately utilized national sentiment as an input or raw material in the
processes of production. In Hawaiian plantations, Filipino foremen, who were goaded to
increase labor productivity by appealing to workers’ national pride, urged their co-
nationals to “do a good job and show the people of other nations what we can do. Let us
not shame our skin” [ibid.: ]. Cognizant of the gaze of apparently superior nations and
races, the foremen’s reference to “skin” exposed their own complicity in the racist
strategies of capital. Apropos the labor market segmentation prevailing at that time, race
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and nationality/ethnicity ranked the plantation workforce into a hierarchy in which
managers were haoles (“whites”), foremen were Spaniards and Portuguese (the “white-
ness” of southern Europeans being questionable [Bonnett ]), skilled workers were
Japanese, and unskilled workers were Filipinos. This stratification was also evident in
the segregated living quarters of employees. In the U. S. Navy, until as late as 
Filipino employees were restricted to menial positions such as officers’ stewards and
mess attendants, a prolongation of many a Manilaman’s position in the late nineteenth
century.
In the wake of the oil boom of the s, the recruitment of migrant labor surged on
an unprecedented scale in the Persian Gulf states as petrodollars led to widespread
economic modernization that triggered a flurry of construction projects. Both state and
capital came to prefer “Asians” to foreign Arabs at lower levels of the workforce.
Non-Muslim workers from South to East Asia fit the bill of a docile labor force that poses
minimal political and religious risks as they are not likely to espouse pan-Arabist ideals,
exacerbate tensions among groups with different Islamic persuasions, and stake moral
claims to citizenship. Asian migrants to Persian Gulf states have been easy “to regulate
socially: racial distinctiveness made easier to enforce policies that segregated foreigners’
housing” [Margold : ].
In multinational companies located in the Persian Gulf region Filipinos have found
employment as contractual engineers, drivers and construction workers. Their remuner-
ation fits a multinational hierarchy of wages, in which Filipinos earn more than Bangla-
deshis but less than Koreans, who in turn earn less than American, British, French,
Italian, and similar employees [Gibson and Graham : ]. Construction sites in the
region have thus been agglomerations of multiracial workers subject to barracks-style
regimentation in confined desert spaces. These sites resonate with images of colonial
plantations devoted to rubber and palm oil production in remote parts of the Sumatran
East Coast and of Cochinchina [Breman ; Murray ]. Evidently, today’s global
system of contracting migrant workers has replaced the nineteenth-century scheme of
indentured labor, which in its time replaced slave and convict labor. Through the
centuries different forms and regimes by which capital exploits mobile labor have
evolved, the crudest aspects effaced, penal sanctions transferred from plantation capital
to the state, and the commodification of labor power made more stark, but the underlying
relations to extract the surplus product have persisted.
The Resurgence of Paid Domestic Work
A visibly pre-capitalist relation, domestic service as a form of labor rendered by non-
family members has survived the industrial transformation of housework in advanced
economies, and the practice is thriving remarkably well today. In preindustrial North-
  
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west Europe, for instance, migratory “servants” were a ubiquitous feature of late eigh-
teenth-century households. Some “servants” performed housework , but most partici-
pated in farming or craft activities, were generally young and unmarried, and lived as
dependent members of their master’s household [Hajnal : ]. Servanthood was
a specific stage in the lifecourse of European youth, who subsequently left the job to form
households of their own. By the s, as industrialization and urbanization gained
momentum, real wages began to rise and servants became relatively more expensive,
causing a decline in the proportion of the labor force accounted for by servants [Hoffman
et al. ]. At about the same time, males, who constituted the elite of domestic service
and fetched wages about double those of females, ceased to form a significant portion of
domestic servants, a category that then became almost completely feminized. In addition
to men opting for industrial work, the decline in male servants occurred as aristocratic
employers, the usual hirers of male servants for their large household staffs, became
fewer, outnumbered by urban middle-class employers among whom a single live-in maid
was common [McBride 	: 
]. The expanding new middle classes saw the demand
for domestic workers peak in mid-century.
By the early twentieth century, income disparities in Western Europe had narrowed.
Britain in the s still counted over  million domestic servants, many of whom were
female migrants from Ireland, but the shortage of servants already had been designated
officially as a “problem” [Goodman and Redclift : ]. The eventual eclipse of paid
domestic work occurred alongside the increasing rates of female participation in the
formal labor force, the reinvention of the kitchen, the rise of home technologies, and the
emergence of “eating out” and other household labor-saving strategies. These transfor-
mations occurred while food production itself was becoming a deeply globalized agro-
industrial regime [Friedmann and McMichael ; Goodman and Redclift ]. In the
colonies, however, European colonists would continue until the final fall of empires their
peculiarly Orientalist practices of hiring male and female domestic workers, thereby
protracting aristocratic pretensions, even as the hiring of servants in Europe itself was on
the decline [Locher-Scholten ; Chin : 	].
But the late twentieth century saw paid domestic service resurface with great force
in “the West,” not as a mere vestige from the past but as an integral part of contemporary
social formations. When Western economies acquired a postindustrial form beginning in
the s, labor migration ceased to be directed primarily at filling “menial jobs in the
public services and dirty jobs in the manufacturing sector” as was the case in the s
and 	s [Held et al. : 
]. Instead, increasing numbers of migrants from other parts
of Europe and from Africa, Asia, and Latin America have found employment in private
service industries and domestic services. In the United Kingdom the amount spent on
domestic workers quadrupled from £ billion in  to £
 billion in 	 [Anderson
: ].
Several factors explain this resurgence in paid domestic work. The aging population,
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the pressure on working women, and the demand for comparatively cheap labor, for
instance, have opened Canada’s gates to immigrant women to work there as nannies and
as home-based caregivers to the elderly. But caregiver workers from the Philippines are
admitted on a “preimmigrant” status that renders their position “inferior” to landed
immigrants [Pratt ]. In general, migrant domestic workers in Western economies are
seen as substituting for the household-based social reproductive labor of local women,
who are enabled to pursue careers and paid employment elsewhere. However, as Bridget
Anderson [] points out, migrant domestic workers in Europe not only care for
children and the elderly but also service the middle-class lifestyle of female employers.
By passing on wifely and parental chores to the hired worker, the female employer
maintains the role of the “good housekeeper” while exercising supervision over the
worker, enjoying leisure time, and meeting the contradictory expectations society holds
of the middle-class woman. Paralleling gender identities in Victorian England, the hiring
of cleaners in English household in the s has often been justified “by the parents’
desire for ‘quality time’ with each other and their children to assist in their social,
emotional and educational development” [ibid.: , ]. The paid domestic worker thus
facilitates the reproduction of social status as much as it does the reproduction of labor.
Conditions specific to late twentieth-century global capitalism account for the roles
of waged domestic workers in servicing a broad range of middle-class lifestyles in
Western economies. Female migrant workers are especially valued as private caregivers
who are expected to nurture a “special” relationship with those they look after, making
them an affordable source of commodified care whose devotion to the family member is
deemed superior to what is obtainable in a crèche or old people’s home. Migrant workers
not only step into the breach created by the retreating welfare state under the onslaught
of neoliberal policies, but offer exemplary services wealthy private employers can buy
from the labor market. Unlike the earlier form of servanthood in Western Europe that
relied upon local rural-to-urban and transregional migrations, the new labor market of
domestic workers is supplied by global migratory flows, with origin states taking an
active part in labor export. Moreover, unlike the late eighteenth century, today’s global
migrants perform domestic work not as a stage in the lifecourse prior to marriage but as
a full-time occupation. Mature-age migrant workers are engaged in this occupation for
many years, for some until the end of their working life, such that the married pass on the
rearing of their own children to others in the homeland or the single diminish their
chances of ever finding a partner. Despite years in paid domestic service, migrant women
never attain the status of “professionals,” and the occupation itself often escapes state
regulation as in ages past.
However, in the s, before postindustrialism became manifest in Europe and as
historians declared that the domestic servant had disappeared in the middle-class house-
hold, a form of hired domestic work rendered by migrants was already in evidence in the
au pair system. In the guise of cultural exchange formalized by an agreement in
  
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Strasbourg in , this system permitted young persons (mostly females) from selected
south and east European states to learn a foreign language by living with host families,
helping in housework, and earning some pocket money [ibid.: ]. The au pair is not
considered a worker, can work legally for limited hours per week only, and is not covered
by social security laws. In reality, au pairs work full days and in household situations
where they are not accorded equal treatment. The au pair system has been used to recruit
migrant workers from the Philippines [ibid.: ], thereby devaluing domestic work as a
transitory exercise in cultural exchange and positioning the country oddly as an exten-
sion of Europe.
Paid Domesticity in East and Southeast Asia
For very similar reasons as in Western economies but with the transformation coming
about in a compressed timeframe, the newly industrializing economies of East and
Southeast Asia have witnessed the widespread employment of foreign domestic workers
from the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Thailand and other countries. Japan is
rather exceptional in its very minimal hiring of paid domestic workers. This situation is
probably due to the institutionalized barriers to women’s full-time formal employment,
the restricted space of Japanese dwelling units, problems of communication with foreign-
ers, and the expense of hiring a “governess,” the term used by one employer-informant
who hired one so her children could learn English. Migrant women’s contribution to
social reproduction in Japan comes mainly in the form of employment as “entertainers”
of men, which in many, but not all, cases includes the provision of commodified sexual
encounters.
In industrializing Asia, particularly Hong Kong and Singapore, overnight wealth
would appear to have rekindled an old practice once possible only for the wealthiest of
households but now affordable to large segments of the emerging middle classes. How-
ever, the hiring of migrant domestic workers is not a mere penchant from the past but an
unprecedented structural necessity. As state-led growth brought educated women into
the workforce in large numbers, assistance was needed for childcare and housework. But
help could not be expected from the extended Chinese household that, given limited
housing spaces, ceased to be feasible. Concomitantly, “traditional” sources of domestic
workers began to dry up as factory work began to offer alternative employment to the
less educated local women. Because of these economies’ small population base and
absence of a hinterland, surplus labor was internally not available. Moreover, domestic
service began to be eschewed by locals as an undesirable, low-status, poorly paid, and
even stigmatized, occupation. At the same time, employers began to feel disenchanted
with “traditional” domestic workers, generally older women who had set views regarding
household practices that conflicted with those of their younger generation employers.
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Many of the continuing local domestic workers also realized that the labor shortage could
be turned to their favor, and began to limit the tasks they performed. As Nicole
Constable [: ] has recounted, by the s Hong Kong employers began to feel that
“the ‘Chinese servants’, or amahs (paid domestic workers) were ‘not as good as they used
to be’” and “complained about how domineering and demanding Chinese domestic
workers had become.” In  the Hong Kong government allowed the entry of foreign
domestic workers, initially to cater to the expatriate community, but in no time migrant
women were meeting the demand of middle-class Chinese households that wanted
workers who could communicate in English. Among other countries, the Philippines was
well suited to provide the “modern” labor force required in domestic work.
Thus, the hiring of foreign workers has become indispensable in nucleated middle-
class households in order to allow employer-women to pursue careers as professional
wage earners [Hing ]. As in Western economies, migrant women are integral to
economic production and social reproduction in Asia’s industrializing economies, and
ultimately to global capitalism. The prevalence of domestic work, though a seeming
throwback to ancient times, is an indisputably modern component of capitalist relations.
In Malaysia the hiring of migrant domestic workers from the Philippines and Indonesia
has been encouraged since the s, despite their then illegal status, specifically to
impress upon the public the successful attainment of the state’s economic-racial objec-
tives, which sought the upward socioeconomic mobility of Malays vis-à-vis Chinese.
With no Malays needing to work in the subservient position of servant in a Chinese
household, all races would appear to be equal partakers of Malaysia’s modernity project
[Chin ]. Still, the Malaysian state has stipulated certain requirements for eligibility
to hire a foreign domestic worker: a benchmark income, a legal marriage certificate, and
birth certificates of children in a nuclear householdthe overt markers of a modern
middle-class lifestyle to which the state sought to induct its citizenry.
The modernity of paid domestic work relies on the backwardness of exploitation
legitimated by patriarchal biases, but also on the novelty of working parents and spouses.
The new social relation between employer and migrant worker breeds tensions and
frictions for both parties, as it once did for the then new middle classes of England and
France for whom manuals were created to deal with the “servant problem” [McBride :
]. As Constable’s [] study of Hong Kong reveals, the employment of Filipina
domestic workers generates frictions and insecurities. Many female employers regard
migrant women as promiscuous and potential seducers of their husbands, resulting in a
behavior pattern that seeks to rein in migrant workers to conform to the debased role of
“amah.” In effect, female employers deflect the mistrust that might legitimately be
directed at their husbands. Anxieties about morality and sexuality, Constable adds, also
stem from employers’ discomfort over Filipina migrants’ high levels of education. Moth-
ers may also compete with hired workers over the emotions of children, who spend more
time with the domestic worker than the working parent. Female employers’ jealousy,
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which impels them to discipline foreign domestic workers, is symptomatic of the difficul-
ty they encounter in controlling their husbands’ fidelity, their children’s affection, and
other aspects of their everyday world.
The complaints that attend the hiring of migrant labor notwithstanding, the appar-
ent backwardness of domestic work is also the very source of social status for the
employer. By hiring a foreign domestic worker as an item of conspicuous consumption
and an emblem of one’s “sense of distinction” [Bourdieu ], the insecure middle classes
can adduce claims to the lifestyle of those who have “arrived.” In Singapore, households
must have an annual income of over S $ to be entitled to employ a domestic worker.
Although the state-driven Singapore Dream stipulates the three “Cs”car, condominium,
club membershipthose who cannot “upgrade” to this standard, and continue to live in
public housing estates, can nonetheless qualify for the dream’s watered-down version by
being serviced by a foreign domestic worker [Hing : 	]. While in today’s Europe
migrant domestic workers reproduce middle-class status, in Asian contexts such as those
typified by Singapore the hiring of migrant women provides a form of reassurance, an
overt signal that one has met the bare minimum standard of middle class existence. But
the hiring of migrant workers by the new rich in industrializing Asia is a reminder of
nineteenth-century England and France where nouveau riche “employers used servants
to emphasise their own social position,” impelling them to demand the observance of
social rules of deference [McBride 
: 	].
As evinced by the wage structure, the reproductive and status-boosting utility of
migrant domestic workers would seem to be non-uniform, for the general pattern of
wages is determined by the migrant women’s nationality. In a labor market segmented
by intra-Asian preferences and prejudices, remuneration follows a hierarchy of national
stereotypes. In Singapore, Filipina domestic workers are ranked at the top, Sri Lankans
at the bottom, Indonesians somewhere in between, with all of them unassailably beneath
the Singaporean employer [Huang and Yeoh ]. In Hong Kong the hierarchy of wages,
often below the legal minimum wage, places Filipinas at the top, followed by Sri Lankan
women, and then by Indonesian and Nepali women, with Indian women at the bottom of
the continuum [Cheng : ]. In Malaysia the wage hierarchy and labor market
segmentation is state-mandated: to employ a Filipina worker with a monthly salary of
RM 	, the household’s annual income must be at least RM ; to hire an Indonesian
worker with a salary of RM , household income must reach RM  [Chin :
]. Akin to the social segregation and racial division of labor of colonial Malaya, Filipina
workers, who are mostly Catholic, are channeled to Chinese employers while Indonesian
workers, who are Muslims, find their way to fellow Muslim Malay employers. Income
disparities and labor market mechanisms, more than religion, are responsible for this
segmentation, as suggested by protests aired in  by both Malays and non-Malays that
led to the setting aside of a regulation meant to ensure the religious purity of Muslim
domestic workers and employers [ibid.: ].
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The wage hierarchy of domestic workers in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia has
an analogue in contemporary Europe, where wage stratification indicates a ranking of
workers by national origin, in a system that intersects broadly with racialist concerns
and national stereotypes. Although the wage hierarchy varies from city to city, Filipinas
are generally at the top and blacks from parts of Africa at the bottom [Anderson :
]. In some cities such as Athens, Poles earn as much as Filipinas, while Albanians
and Ukrainians are low on the hierarchy, suggesting that skin color per se is not the sole
factor in the stereotype-laden salary scale. Filipinas’ knowledge of the English language,
their cultural and linguistic adaptability, their historically sharpened predilection to
things modern, their convivial and hardworking character, and the relative strength,
bargaining power, and informational, institutional and other resources of formal and
informal migrant networks place them among the highest paid domestic workers world-
wide. The material and personal rewards to overseas employment, however, do not
diminish the fact that work in this occupation replicates iniquitous national and gender
disparities, the prejudices of race, and the exclusionary practices against non-citizen
migrants. As in the past, the spectacle of non-migrant “rich women” using, if not
exploiting, the labor of migrant “poor women” suggests that, ultimately, the nexus of
class relations, within and across states, are deeply implicated in the contemporary global
practice of paid domestic work.
“National” Class Structures in the Global Economy
Notwithstanding the interconnectedness of the global economy and the physical bodies
of alien workers that visualize the transboundary interpenetration of labor forces, class
structures remain stubbornly “national” in their imagery. On the base of preexisting
national identities, the re-nationalization of class structures is largely orchestrated by
participating states that directly regulate, control, promote, and profit from migrant
labor. However, the reality is that class relations that are seemingly confined to
nation-states have been configured jointly by domestic as well as global and trans-
national forces. Contemporary capitalism, it can be further argued, has crystallized a
global underclass a principal feature of which is its huge deficit in citizenship rights
[cf. Heisler ]. The political exclusion of economically integral migrant workers
appears “natural” as the limits of citizenship rights are legitimated by the ideology of
national belonging [Aguilar ].
In the destination-states the global underclass of domestic servants, construction and
factory workers, and menial day laborers is composed of many ethnicities and nationali-
ties. Their heterogeneity is no obstacle to their classification and easy identification as
aliens, whose political segregation is mandated, imposed and enforced by the state. In
various Asian contexts these states intrude into the private sphere by ruling on migrants’
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sexualities, such as forbidding pregnancies among migrant women. Often feared as
troublemakers and transgressors of the “host” society’s moral order, they are nonetheless
unavoidably allowed into the privacy of homes where their labor services are needed.
They are socially marginal yet paradoxically intimate strangers to the people they serve
[Aguilar a: ]. Physical and socioeconomic integrality to the destination-state
notwithstanding, their non-membership in the imagined community renders non-citizen
migrant workers irremediably foreign and, as such, outside its class structure.
Unless imbued by some universalist ideal as those held by some Christian and human
rights organizations, hardly would local NGOs see migrant workers as their constituents.
Generally, migrant workers are seen as the responsibility of their “home governments”
and of NGOs organized by migrant-leaders themselves or by migrants’ own co-nationals.
Exclusion by the “host” and the migrants’ own sensibilities canalize most migrant worker
networks and associations within the modular boundaries of the nation. Cross-national
linkages do existsuch as Hong Kong’s Asian Migrant Coordinating Body, a coalition of
domestic workers from India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand
that in February and March  protested against a wage cut of HK$ per month (
percent of the minimum) and a levy on foreign workers [Micaller a; b]. But the
Hong Kong alliance is exceptional. The broad conclusion is that the global underclass is
far from constituting a class for itself, and state restrictions on political activities in most
places other than Hong Kong ensure that cross-national solidarities do not flourish.
Amid the challenges and deprivations of living in another land, migrant workers
predictably fall back on co-nationals for succor and companionship. When confronted
with verbal violence against their personaspersions are often cast in national terms:
“Filipinos are dogs,” “Filipinas are stupid”their defense of the self invariably stands by
national honor and deepens national identification [Aguilar ]. The global workplace
thus reinforces the national identity of migrant workers. At the same time, higher status
migrant workers, often termed expatriate professionals to denote their more privileged
position, exert every effort not to associate with low-status migrant workers even if they
share the same national origin. Middle-class status distinctions and cultural differences
that mark the national homeland are replicated overseas, resulting in the fragmentation
of overseas Filipino communities. Internal divisions and other factors cause the
migrant’s children’s relationship to the parental homeland to be extremely complex and
unpredictable [Aguilar forthcoming]. However, the inequalities of the homeland, precise-
ly because of their transportability, all the more underscore the “national” character of
the class structure. Filipino class relations seemingly migrate and, even overseas, appear
innately Filipino.
In the destination-states the “national” class structure gives the impression of being
clearly demarcated from migrant workers. Because migrants tend to take up occupations
that are least desired because of their association with dirt, risk, and low pay, even the
least of the destination-state’s “national” proletariat see themselves as lucky, for they do
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not have to endure separation from kin and kith only to find miserable jobs. The
receiving state’s sense of nationhood is also refurbished vis-à-vis foreign workers who
constitute the “new outsiders.” In Malaysia, the religious imagined community gives way
to the national community as Muslim Malays perceive a closer affinity with Chinese and
Indian Malaysians than with Muslim migrants from Bosnia, Indonesia and Nigeria [Hing
]. Ultimately, destination-state elites, their nationalist ideologies and distinctive
authoritarian regimes, strengthen their legitimacy in the eyes of even their poorest
citizens. The migrants’ political marginality reinforces the national sentiment of the
destination-state’s citizen workforce, at the same time that the national identity of
workers displaced from their homelands is strengthened. The circulation of labor in the
current epoch of globalization refurbishes the national identity of both non-migrant and
migrant populations.
In an origin-state such as the Philippines, labor migrants are constituted as exten-
sions of the “national” economy of an effectively deterritorialized state, but without
rights of extraterritoriality. As the nation’s external appendages, migrant workers
dramatize the country’s transborder political economy. The “enlargement” of the state
through labor export is promoted, regulated and sustained by the state for its pecuniary
advantages. And because individual migrants also benefit from overseas employment,
the official policy has resulted in a substantial (but by no means exact) congruence of
migrant labor and origin-state interests. In deploying its citizens worldwide, there is a
sense in which the national geo-body moves along with the bodies of migrants [Tadiar
]. Despite agitation in the homeland, the pragmatics of state sovereignty constrain
the sending, therefore weaker, country from extending “full protection” to its citizens
overseas. Political emasculation, however, does not hinder the origin-state from reaping
economic benefits from migrants’ toils and exertions. The billions of dollars migrants
remit to the Philippines significantly prop up the national economy amid global down-
turns and internally generated crises. Migrants’ remittances have shored up the
country’s gross international reserves, making up for the decline in Philippine exports in
the wake of the world economy’s slowdown in recent years.
According to Migration News [], total worldwide remittances (the sum of
workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers) have reached
US $ billion in , a gargantuan jump from a baseline figure of less than US $ billion
in . The  estimate has been described as exceeding official development assis-
tance from OECD countries to the developing world and surpassing total foreign direct
investment of U. S. companies in emerging markets [Frank ]. Given this bonanza, it
is not surprising that peripheral states should deliberately send out its citizens like an
army of gleaners around the world. These origin-states have adopted public policies to
encourage migrants to send remittances through channels that are relatively easy, cheap,
and secure. Not only have these states relied upon the usual remittances but they have
also sought investments by (former) citizens or their descendants, as China has done and
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the Philippines is seeking to emulate. The large-scale displacements of people orchestra-
ted by imperial powers in times past and recent accretions to migrant populations have
become crucial instruments by which former colonies and neo-colonies have cornered
and appropriated a portion of the global surplus, buoying up, if not accelerating, internal
processes of capital accumulation. Through transborder migrations, peripheral states
renegotiate their participation in the global economy.
Remittances signal the importance of culture-specific norms of social reproduction in
different parts of the global economy. Because labor in the periphery is reproduced at a
lower cost than in advanced economies, the latter’s utilization of migrant labor at
relatively low rates compared to local citizens due to national-racial factors indicates a
considerable subsidy from the less to the more advanced economy. But to the extent that
migrant labor wage rates are respectably higher than comparable rates in the origin,
migrant labor derives a certain “windfall” in individual returns to labor. This individual
advantage is realized only because migrant workers follow different cultural norms of
subsistence from those of their destination and because the major costs of social repro-
duction are expended in the peripheral economy, the homeland being the site of “cheaper”
consumption. The difference between wages and overseas survival costs makes a
modicum of personal savings and remittances possible, minus the costs of job searches,
international travel and overseas living expenses shouldered by the migrant worker. A
calculus of this difference is an important aspect of the migration decision. The capacity
to remit, if individually small but collectively a fortune, is what labor-sending states
exploit, control and coopt.
Globally, sites of production, although transnationally integrated, are fragmented
and visually occluded from sites of consumption. This spatial disjuncture is observable
not only in the case of transnational corporations but also among migrants and their
networks. Transnational commodity fetishism, which undergirds transborder labor
migrations, magnifies the mystification of capitalism. The low-status migrant in the
overseas production site is transformed into a relatively high-caliber consumer of moder-
nity in the homeland. The migrant’s functionality to the employer’s middle-class exis-
tence in the advanced economy enables the migrant’s household in the origin-state to
move up along the continuum of the middle classes. The two geographically separate
poles of middle-class existence are linked in the person of the migrant worker. In tandem
with material gains, the migrant’s symbolic capital is boosted as she or he is made a
model of success in her/his locality of origin. While working overseas, awaiting the
eventual return to the natal land, the labor migrant soothes the pains and challenges of
social liminality and physical dislocation with the balm of commodities and commodity
consumption [Aguilar b]. At the end of the day, the allure of commodity fetishism
and the joys of money, which traverses space and differential currency exchange rates,
legitimate overseas employment and the sending state’s strategy. They also serve to
legitimate global capitalism.
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Transnational Agrarian Class Relations
In the homeland, therefore, migrants’ households experience some degree of upward
mobility even if observers lament that remittances are frequently spent on “unproduc-
tive” activities, such as house repair or construction, children’s education, and daily
subsistence. Education, however, can be considered an investment that yields returns in
the future and opens doors to social mobility, not infrequently through overseas migra-
tion of other family members. In the near term, studies suggest that, at the local level, the
inflow of migrant remittances, while improving income levels of some households, tends
to worsen village inequality. But the local economic pie enlarges marginally, and the
national cumulatively.
Overseas remittances significantly complicate the hybrid forms of class relations and
overlapping circuits of exploitation that make and define class structures in rural
Southeast Asia [Aguilar ; Turton ]. In an agrarian setting, the peasant’s daughter
who works overseas, say as an “entertainer” in Japan, may send remittances that enable
the household to not only overcome what Henry Bernstein [] calls the “simple
reproduction squeeze,” but to experience significant upward social mobility. Studies by
Cynthia Bautista [] in a village in Pampanga and by Nobuhiko Fuwa [; ] in a
village in Pangasinan attest to dramatic transformations of formerly small tenant and
irregularly employed households due to overseas remittances. Although some of them
used remittances in fleeting consumption, others invested in such assets as land and
agricultural machinery. Thus remittances may transform a tenant-farmer household,
first of all, into a capitalized peasant cultivator, with secure access to land and the ability
to afford farm inputs, consequently not needing to pawn one’s possessions [cf. Nishimura
]. But remittances may also transform the peasant into a petty capitalist employer of
farm labor. The peasant may rely primarily, or even completely, on hired hands to
cultivate the land, freeing the farm owner to derive cash income from waged work
elsewhere or to engage in a small enterprise such as driving one’s own pedicab. Through
monetary infusions, migrants’ overseas employment in manufacturing or services in-
dustries may directly stimulate peasant capitalism and rural micro-capitalist industry.
Remittances promote as well as complicate hybrid class formations in the migrant’s
origin even as a global underclass forms a structural adjunct to the class structure in the
destination.
Another part-peasant capitalist and part-wage earner may sell whatever assets are
owned, including land and carabao, to “capitalize” the sojourn overseas. This person may
become a member of the global proletariat by joining, for instance, the multiethnic
transnational construction industry. In time personal capital accumulation may allow
the migrant to return to the homeland, the savings invested, say, in acquiring a vehicle
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for use in a taxi business, which allows the former migrant proletariat to be transformed
into a self-employed, joining the ranks of the urban petty bourgeoisie. (Or if the former
part-peasant capitalist fails to accumulate personal capital, the migrant may return to the
origin and eke out a livelihood from the “informal sector” by taking up casual work, say,
as a jeepney driver.) In cases where remittances go largely to finance children’s education
or defray the costs of daily sustenance, overseas remittances nonetheless “capitalize” and
“modernize” the rural economy that, in the process, is directly imbricated with the
contradictions of global capital accumulation. In addition, some transnational migrant
networks have been engaged in the provision of development assistance to their origin-
localities; by pooling their resources, organized migrants step into the breach not met by
the homeland state or international aid agencies [Portes ]. Migrant-funded projects
in health care and minor public works, for instance, have brought the celebrated case of
Pozorrubio in Pangasinan province into the limelight [Frank ]. Needless to say,
migrant labor gets but the crumbs of global capital. Still, the crumbs go a long way in
transforming the periphery.
An interesting case of agrarian capitalism and rural social reproduction across state
borders is discussed by Nobue Suzuki []. Due to a scarcity of marriageable women
arising from internal rural-to-urban migration, a local government in Japan initiated in
 a cooperative agreement with a counterpart entity in the Philippines for the supply
of Filipina brides. The migration of brides has served as a type of gendered labor
recruitment to ensure the survival and continuity of the ie or rural household system in
depopulated villages. Through “international marriages” the ie is supplied with the
requisite female labor for both farm and household. Migrant women are desired for their
fecundability and labor power, creating a complicated social arrangement in rural Japan
while altering social relations in the rural Philippines. The points of articulation in global
migrations are thus not limited to urban centers but also involve transboundary rural-to-
rural linkages and class transformations.
The State as Antagonist of Migrant Labor
Destination-states realize the structural significance of migrants in supplementing and
complementing the labor power of their own citizens, making the importation of foreign
labor an indispensable component of these states’ economic strategies. Migrant workers
are especially useful because of their paucity of citizen rights; in many of these states
they have no recourse even to nominal labor legislation. Although geographic move-
ments have been a standard feature of human history, the borders of today’s stronger
states are deliberately made either porous or impenetrable to migrant labor as the need
arises. Needless to say, the rights of states supersede the rights of migrants. Notwith-
standing UN declarations that promote global citizenship via the catholicity of human
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rights, states retain the right to set the conditions under which foreigners and non-
citizens enter and reside in their territory. In the Asian region, destination-states
willfully ignore the ILO Convention on the rights of migrant workers, which specifies
that, after two years, “guest” workers are entitled to family unification and a full range of
benefits, including the right to stay [Aguilar ]. On the contrary, restrictive actions
and policies of labor-receiving states transpose the oppositional relationship between
capital and labor into a new axis of opposition between state and migrant labor.
Especially because employers and illegal migrants may desire extra-legal labor recruit-
ment, economic contradictions become political in the first instance.
Although destination-states are in a stronger position vis-à-vis origin states, no
overt bullying occurs. Geo-politics and economic interdependencies constrain labor-
destination states from acting as if they were a superordinate power over labor-sending
states. In Southeast Asia, states have been cautious not to strain bilateral relations, as
witnessed in Singapore’s caning of illegal Thai workers in  and its execution of
convicted Filipina migrant Flor Contemplacion in . Instead of fomenting con-
troversies over migrant labor, origin and destination states have modulated their actions
and responses for the sake of mutual political and economic ends. Even the expulsion of
undocumented Indonesian and Filipino workers in Malaysia in August  was con-
ducted with sufficient advanced notice, and the controversy over the repatriation
process, albeit flawed, has not been allowed to blow out of proportion [INQ7.net ].
Within ASEAN, state actions are geared toward the mutual accommodation of interests.
Pursuing its own institutional agenda, the Singapore state has turned migrant labor
into a multimillion-dollar state monopoly by imposing a monthly levy on the hiring of
different types of foreign labor. In the case of domestic workers, the monthly levy in 
was S$ (up from S$ in 	); with an estimated 
 households employing
domestic workers, Singapore generates an annual revenue of about S$ million. Amid
the economic downturn and a gaping deficit of HK$
 billion, Hong Kong has imitated
Singapore by imposing a levy of HK$ per month starting October , which will
yield an annual revenue of HK$ billion based on an estimated  foreign
domestic workers. While the labor-sending state benefits only indirectly from the
overseas deployment of its citizens, Singapore and Hong Kong gain directly from the
“foreign maid industry.”
Avowedly protecting its overseas citizenry and faced with a drastic reduction in
remittances (as, on top of the levy, huge wage cuts also begin in April ), the Philippine
government lobbied against Hong Kong’s wage cut and levy measures, but to no avail
[BusinessWorld ; Lema ; Micaller b]. In protest the Philippines has temporar-
ily suspended the official deployment of domestic workers to the territory. It is also
forming a broad alliance of labor-sending states with India, Indonesia, Nepal, Thailand
and Vietnam to obtain a reversal of Hong Kong’s decision [INQ7.net b]. Whether a
multilateral initiativeakin to a migrant labor cartel but organized by stateswill
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succeed remains to be seen. But this case highlights that relations between state and
migrant labor are, despite economic realities, political in the first instance. In pursuit of
their own economic interests and with an eye at domestic politics, labor-origin states
appear to coalesce on behalf of their dispersed citizenry, seeking to succeed where
multinational worker alliances have failed. In the end, the home government would seem
the last bastion of migrant labor. Amid this circuitous conflict, the nation-state defends
its legitimacy within and outside its borders.
Beyond Hong Kong migrant workers continue to toil under conditions dictated by
the destination-state. In Singapore, the monthly levy often exceeds the monthly mone-
tary remuneration received by the domestic worker, but the Philippines has not pro-
tested. There the total wage bill shouldered by the employer is the sum of the worker’s
(cash and non-cash) salary and the government levy. The state apparatus wields its
power as it expropriates and appropriates the “surplus product” generated by the
migrant worker and, given the levy’s disproportionate share of total wages, even claims
a part of the migrant worker’s “subsistence fund.” In this context, the state-qua-capitalist
is in direct contradictory relationship to migrant labor, a novel type of transborder class
relation between a territorial state and the non-citizen workers admitted to its territory.
The destination-state thus occupies vis-à-vis the migrant worker the dual position of
political overlord and state capitalist exploiter. If even multinational corporations, local
enterprises, and household employers have no recourse but to comply with the dictates
of the sovereign state, what can migrant labor do?
Conclusion
The tighter interconnectedness of the uneven global economy and various economic
liberalization measures dating to the s have rekindled old forms of labor processes.
Whether in seafaring or domestic work, labor relations involving migrant workers
suggest conditions peculiar to late twentieth-century capitalism. Old labor forms have
become indispensable in the economic strategies of states and, at the social group level,
in the making, assertion and maintenance of social class and status positions across state
boundaries. Middle-class lifestyles and labor forces stratified by nationality are repro-
duced and propped up by a global underclass of politically disenfranchised non-citizen
workers. Unlike in the past, interstate relations are directly implicated in the transborder
movements of labor. Origin-states are at the forefront of labor recruitment and deploy-
ment because migrant workers’ remittances sustain their economies and allow them to
negotiate the treacherous waters of global capitalism. On the other hand, destination-
states protect their institutional interests and ensure legitimacy by either relaxing or
tightening immigration rules; by allowing labor in-migration, these states facilitate the
pursuit of neoliberal policies as they retreat from the provision of social welfare mea-
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sures. In the origin, migrant remittances widen village-level inequality, but also radically
alter household conditions in ways that stimulate agrarian economies and reproduce
hybrid class relations. While creating multi-stranded transnational linkages, the global
labor market simultaneously deepens the national sentiment of migrant and non-migrant
populations. Remaining entrenched is the perception that class structures are national
formations. Despite glimmers of cross-national alliances, state strictures and portable
nationhood do not augur well for cosmopolitan solidarities.
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and I thank them.
References
Aguilar, Filomeno. . The Philippine Peasant as Capitalist: Beyond the Categories of Ideal-
Typical Capitalism. Journal of Peasant Studies  (  ): .
. . The Dialectics of Transnational Shame and National Identity. Philippine Sociological
Review : 	.
. . The Triumph of Instrumental Citizenship? Migrations, Identities, and the Nation-
State in Southeast Asia. Asian Studies Review 	 ( 	 ): 			.
. . Nationhood and Transborder Labor Migrations: The Late Twentieth Century from a
Late Nineteenth-Century Perspective. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal  (  ): .
. a. Beyond Stereotypes: Human Subjectivity in the Structuring of Global Migrations.
In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp. 	.
Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council.
. b. Ritual Passage and the Reconstitution of Selfhood in International Labour Migra-
tion. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp.
	
. Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science
Council.
. Forthcoming. Is There a Transnation? Migrancy and the National Homeland among
Overseas Filipinos. In Placing the Transnation: Transnational Communities in the Asia-Pacific
Region, edited by Brenda Yeoh et al. London: Routledge.
Anderson, Bridget. . Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour. London and
New York: Zed Books.
Appadurai, Arjun. 	. Patriotism and Its Futures. Public Culture 
 ( 	 ): .
Balibar, Etienne. . Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today. New
Left Review  (March/April): 
.
Basch, Linda; Schiller, Nina Glick; and Blanc, Cristina Szanton. . Nations Unbound: Transnational




Bautista, Cynthia. . The Saudi Connection: Agrarian Change in a Pampangan Village, .
In Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia, edited by Gillian
Hart et al., pp. . Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.
Bernstein, Henry. . Concepts for the Analysis of Contemporary Peasantries. In The Political
Economy of Rural Development: Peasants, International Capital, and the State, edited by Rosemary
Galli, pp. . Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Bonnett, Alastair. . Who Was White? The Disappearance of Non-European White Identities and
the Formation of European Racial Whiteness. Ethnic and Racial Studies  ( 	 ): 

.
Bourdieu, Pierre. . Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, translated by Richard
Nice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Boxer, Charles Ralph. 	. The Dutch Sea-Borne Empire, 16001800. London: Hutchinson.
Breman, Jan. . Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in South East
Asia. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
BusinessWorld. 

. RP Seeks Neighbors’ Help in Fight vs HK Maid Tax. Business World Internet
Edition,  November. http://www.bworld.com.ph/current/TheNation/nationstory.html
. 

. Absentee Voting Bill Set for Signing. Business World Internet Edition,  February.
http://www.bworld.com.ph/current/TheNation/nationstory.html
Cabungcal, Deanna Margarett. 

. OFW Remittances up . Business World Internet Edition,

 April. http://www/bworld.com.ph/current/TheEconomy/indicator.html
Cheng, Shu-Ju Ada. 	. Migrant Women Domestic Workers in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan:
A Comparative Analysis. In Asian Women in Migration, edited by Graziano Battistella and
Anthony Paganoni, pp. 
. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center.
Chin, Christine B. N. . In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female Domestic Workers and the
Malaysian “Modernity” Project. New York: Columbia University Press.




. Sexuality and Discipline among Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong. In
Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp. 	.
Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council.
Espiritu, Yen Le. 

. Colonial Oppression, Labor Importation, and Group Formation: Filipinos in
the United States. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno
Aguilar, pp. 	




. Checks in the Mail: For a Philippine Town, Monthly Allowances Pave a Road
to Riches: Third World Gets Huge Sums from Relatives Abroad; Some Call It Dependence 
Pozorrubio’s Lights Go On. Wall Street Journal,  May.
Friedmann, Harriet; and McMichael, Philip. . Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and
Decline of National Agricultures, 
 to the Present. Sociologia Ruralis  (  ): .
Fuwa, Nobuhiko. 	. Social Stratification and Mobility in a Pangasinan Barrio, 	.
Pilipinas No. 	 (Spring): 		.
. . The Filipino “Entertainers” in Japan. Philippine Studies  (  ): 
.
Gibson, Katherine; and Graham, Julie. 

. Situating Migrants in Theory: The Case of Filipino
Contract Construction Workers. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited
by Filomeno Aguilar, pp. . Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the
Philippine Social Science Council.
Goodman, David; and Redclift, Michael. . Refashioning Nature: Food, Ecology and Culture.
London and New York: Routledge.
Hajnal, John. . Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation System. Population and
Development Review  (  ): .
A<J>A6G: Global Migrations, Old Labor Forms, and New Transborder Class Relations
159
Heisler, Barbara Schmitter. . A Comparative Perspective on the Underclass: Questions of Urban
Poverty, Race, and Citizenship. Theory and Society  (  ): .
Held, David; McGrew, Anthony; Goldblatt, David; and Perraton, Jonathan. . Global Transforma-
tions: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hing Ai Yun. 	. Foreign Maids and the Reproduction of Labor in Singapore. Philippine
Sociological Review : 
.
. . Migration and the Reconfiguration of Malaysia “My Homeplace.” Journal of
Contemporary Asia  (  ): .
Hoffman, Philip; Jacks, David; Levin, Patricia; and Lindert, Peter. . Real Inequality in Europe
since . Journal of Economic History 	 (  ): .
Huang, Shirlena; and Yeoh, Brenda S. A. . Discourse on Foreign Maids in Singapore: Construc-
tions of the National Self and the Other. Paper presented at the Workshop on Migrations in
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore  January.
INQ7.net. . Macapagal, Mahathir Agree to Resolve Migrants’ Issue. INQ7.net,  August. http:
//www.inq
.net/nat/ /aug/ /text/nat p.htm
. a. Filipino Emigrants Intending to Return Home May Vote. INQ7.net,  February.
http://www.inq
.net/nat/ /feb/ /text/nat p.htm
. b.  Asian States Join RP Drive to Protect Migrant Workers. INQ7.net,  March. http:
//www.inq
.net/nat/ /mar/ /text/nat p.htm
Kahveci, Erol. . Personal communication,  March.
Lema, Karen. . RP Gov’t to Take HK Wage Cut Issue to ILO. Business World Internet Edition, 
March. http://www.bworld.com.ph/current/TheNation/nationstory.html
Locher-Scholten, Elsbeth. . Orientalism and the Rhetoric of the Family: Javanese Servants in
European Household Manuals and Children’s Fiction. Indonesia  (October): .
López Jaena, Graciano. 	 []. The Philippines in the Universal Exposition of Barcelona. In La
Solidarida 1889, translated by Guadalupe Fores-Ganzon. Pasig City: Fundación Santiago.
MacMicking, Robert. 	
. Recollections of Manilla and the Philippines during 1848, 1849, and 1850,
edited by Morton J. Netzorg. Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild.
Mann, Michael. . Globalization and September . New Left Review nd series,  (Nov/Dec):

.
Margold, Jane. . Narratives of Masculinity and Transnational Migration: Filipino Workers in the
Middle East. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno
Aguilar, pp. 	. Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine
Social Science Council.
McBride, Theresa. 
	. The Domestic Revolution: The Modernisation of Household Service in England
and France 18201920. London: Croom Helm.
McFarland, E. W. . Clyde Opinion on an Old Controversy: Indian and Chinese Seafarers in
Glasgow. Ethnic and Racial Studies  (  ): .
McNeill, William. 
. Human Migration: A Historical Overview. In Human Migration: Patterns and
Policies, edited by William McNeill and Ruth Adams, pp. . Bloomington and London:
Indiana University Press.
Micaller, Cookie. a. Filipinos in HK Lead Rally vs Wage Cut. INQ7.net,  February. http://
www.inq
.net/globalnation/sec new/ /feb/ .htm





Migration News. . About Remittances. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/Data/remit.on.www/ab-
outremit.html
Ming, Hanneke. . Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies, 
. Indonesia  (April): 	.
Murray, Martin. . White Gold or White Blood? The Rubber Plantations of Colonial Indochina,




Nishimura, Satoru. . Agricultural Development in Western Visayas: Pawned Lands, Overseas
Workers and Porsiyentuhan. In Binisaya nga Kinabuhi, Visayan Life: Visayas Maritime Anthropo-
logical Studies II, 19931995, edited by Iwao Ushijima and Cynthia Neri Zayas, pp. . Quezon
City: College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines.
Philippine Daily Inquirer. . “Filipina” Means DH in Greek Dictionary. Philippine Daily Inquirer
Internet Edition,  August. http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug /aug /news/news .htm
top
Portes, Alejandro. . Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities. In The
Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In, edited by Don Kalb et al., pp. 	. Lanham,
Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Pratt, Geraldine. . From Registered Nurse to Registered Nanny: Discursive Geographies of
Filipina Domestic Workers in Vancouver, B. C. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the
World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp. 
	. Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research
Network and the Philippine Social Science Council.
Rodriguez, Edgard. . Net Social Benefits of Emigration from the Perspective of the Source




Rufo, Aries; and Ariel Digma. . Filipina Means DH: Be Proud or Be Insulted? Manila Times
Internet Edition,  August. http://www.manilatimes.net/news/news h.html
Sampson, Helen. . Transnational Filipino Seafaring Communities Afloat and Ashore. Presenta-
tion made at the Conference on Transnational Communities in the Asia-Pacific Region: Compar-
ative Perspectives, Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore and the
Transnational Communities Programme, Economic and Social Research Council, Singapore 
August.
Sassen, Saskia. . Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and
Money. New York: The New Press.
Suzuki, Nobue. . Women Imagined, Women Imaging: Re/presentations of Filipinas in Japan
since the s. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno
Aguilar, pp. . Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine
Social Science Council.
Tadiar, Neferti Xina. . Domestic Bodies of the Philippines. In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At
Home in the World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp. 	. Quezon City: Philippine Migration
Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council.
Taylor, Jean Gelman. 	. The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia.
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
Turton, Andrew. . Local Powers and Rural Differentiation. In Agrarian Transformations: Local
Processes and the State in Southeast Asia, edited by Gillian Hart et al., pp. . Berkeley, Los
Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.
Tyner, James A. . Global Cities and Circuits of Global Labor: The Case of Manila, Philippines. In
Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? edited by Filomeno Aguilar, pp.   .
Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council.




Wallerstein, Immanuel. . The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism: Universalism versus Racism
and Sexism. In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, edited by Etienne Balibar and
Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. 	. London and New York: Verso.
Zolberg, Aristide. . International Migration Policies in a Changing World System. In Human
Migration: Patterns and Policies, edited by William McNeill and Ruth Adams, pp. 
.
Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press.
. . Global Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration, . In Global
History and Migration, edited by Wang Gungwu, pp. 	. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
A<J>A6G: Global Migrations, Old Labor Forms, and New Transborder Class Relations
161
